






Alongside the rules which constitute the enacting clauses of the
international Conventions and which, in precise terms, set forth the
contractual obligations of States, there exist principles from which
these rules derive. " Certain ideas formulated with deliberate
imprecision occupy a privileged position in treaties which describe
them as being creative elements of law ".2
Sometimes the Conventions expressly refer to these either in
preambles or even in the main body of the text. Thus they speak of
the " laws of humanity", " recognized custom" and of the
" dictates of the public conscience ".
One should mention the so-called Martens clause of the pre-
amble to the Hague Regulation: "populations and belligerents
remain under the safeguard and influence of the principles of the law
of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples ". In an article common to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 it is stated: "Each Party to the conflict . . . shall
ensure the detailed execution of the preceding Articles, and provide
for unforeseen cases, in conformity with the general principles of the
present Convention ". And in another article, the Parties undertake
1
 See International Review, September 1966.
2
 Henri COURSIER, Vivolution du droit international humanitaire, Leyden, 1960.
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to disseminate the Conventions " so that the principles thereof may
become known to the entire population . . .".
In international humanitarian law, as in every other juridical
sphere, principles are of capital importance. They motivate the
whole, enable the respective value of the facts to be appreciated and
also offer solutions for unexpected cases. They contribute towards
filling gaps in the law and help in their future development by
indicating the path to be followed. As a summary they can be easily
assimilated and remembered.
In the field of law now under study, the principles represent the
rudiments of humanity, a minimum applicable at all times, in all
places and circumstances which are valid even for States which may
not be parties to the Conventions. Although based on written law,
they are part of the custom of peoples from which none can dis-
engage himself. The Red Cross remains true to its mission by placing,
in front of the positive rules formulated by the Conventions, the
principles which preceded them and from which they originated.
As Sophocles has said, " above the written laws, there are those
which are unwritten ".
The Geneva Conventions, by their article 3 common to them,
stipulate that States shall apply certain rules in the case of conflict
not of an international character. One paragraph in this article lays
down, that " the parties to the conflict shall further endeavour to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the
other provisions " of the Conventions. It is to be hoped that the
principles of humanitarian law may serve as a basis for agreements
of this kind, the conclusion of which would be extremely desirable.
There is no doubt that certain of these go back to the distant
past, but it is in modern times that they have assumed a written form
and only from 1864 onwards have they had the character of multi-
lateral agreements. Such as we have formed them, they have been
drawn entirely from positive law. However, because of their general
character one would often seek in vain for wording in the con-
ventional texts.
The principles of international humanitarian law have not, as far
as we know, yet been the subject of any systematic declaration. It
appears to us that one could reduce the substance of this law to a
few very simple notions, about fifteen in all, closely linked and in
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logical sequence, each one of them being subdivided in turn into
several principles of application. This we have attempted to do in a
few lines and in simple form, following them up with brief comments.
1. Fundamental principles
The fundamental principle of humanitarian law is the result of a
compromise between opposed notions: the principle of humanity
and the principle of necessity.
We have seen when studying the sources of humanitarian law,
that humanity requires action always for man's good. On the other
side, by the nature of things can be found a principle of necessity,
namely the maintenance of public order legitimates the use of force;
the state of war justifies resort to violence.
PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
Respect for the individual and his well-being shall be assured as
far as it is compatible with public order and, in time of war, with
military exigencies.
From the very beginning of life, human beings opposed each
other. In all ages, men have suffered under the sword and the yoke;
the pages of history are filled with blood. Everywhere one sees
massacres, torture, oppression. Why?
When a comparative study is made of civilization, one finds that
the concept of life and the world often rests on a dualism, on the
existence of two fundamental factors which face each other and
between which human beings find themselves placed. In Europe,
the man in the street at once thinks of the opposition between good
and bad. But this is too simple and arbitrary an explanation. In the
dualist concepts, the two elements can each have their own value and
even join them.
; This dualism has its origin in the roots of human psychism.
* There is a striking passage to this effect in a letter written by
Sigmund Freud to Albert Einstein, two men of genius:
• You are surprised that it is so easy to incite men to war and you assume that
S they have in them an active principle, an instinct of hatred and destruction all
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ready to welcome this form of excitement . . . We admit that man's instincts
are composed of two categories: the ones who want to preserve and unify, we
call them " erotics ", and those who want to destroy and kill, whom we cover
with the terms " aggressive impulse " or " destructive impulse ".
These impulses are both indispensable to each other. It is from their con-
certed or antagonistic action that are derived the phenomena of life. Now, it
would appear that it scarcely ever arises that an instinct of one of these two
categories can assert itself in isolation; it is always bound up with a certain
amount of the other category, which modifies its object or, as the case may be,
alone enables it to accomplish it. Thus, for example, the instinct of self-preserva-
tion is certainly of an erotic nature, but it is precisely this same instinct which
must resort to aggressiveness if it wants to see its intentions triumph. In the
same way, the love instinct brought to objects has need of a quota of the
possessive instinct, if it wishes definitely to enter into possession of its object.
And it is precisely the difficulty one experiences in isolating these two sorts of
instinct, as they show themselves, which has prevented us from recognizing
that for so long.1
In this way, then, man will seek to kill, to do harm, to dominate
and he will use violence and by derivation will cause suffering, so
that he himself may have a greater chance of surviving, to raise
himself and to increase his power. In each of his fellow men he
first of all sees a rival.
Amongst certain animals, when one of them is wounded or
weakened, members of the same species fall on him and destroy him.
This is what men have had to do to each other for many thousands
of years. Then the defence reflex and a need for security were
extended to the group.
To make this community life possible, it was necessary to
organize society. As it was impossible to change man's nature, one
recognized that his instinctive reactions should be kept in check and
force him to accept reasonable solutions. Carrying out a major
revolution, the community thus created a social order out of which
it has progressively defined the broad outline expressed in an
abstract manner through moral principles.
The power capable of having these standards respected has also
been established, without which they would have remained a dead-
letter. This then is the origin of law and of public institutions.
1
 International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, League of Nations, 1933.
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However, it was also necessary to place limits on this power.
For if the State has as its ultimate object the development of the
individual personality, it risks crushing it at the same time. Its
domination is blind and it extends itself until it is stopped. It was
therefore necessary to guarantee certain fundamental rights to man,
making existence acceptable to all. It was thus that the principle of
respect for the human individual originated, respect for his life and
liberty and finally his happiness.
This vast and slow evolution, for a long time confined within the
limits of each State, ended by reaching the level of international
relations where law was soon to come to grips with war. It was no
longer a question of merely sparing man when in conflict with
society, on account of the established social order, but also with the
enemy himself when his country starts to fight another.
Not being able to claim from the outset to break the scourge of
war itself, attempts were made at least to attenuate its unnecessary
rigours. The reciprocal interests of the belligerents forced them to
observe certain " rules of the game " in the conduct of hostilities.
Such are the origins of the laws of war which constitutes a most
important part of public international law. This achievement, it is
unnecessary to say, is as difficult to pursue in the international field
as it had been on the internal level. It is, moreover, far from being
realized and one could even say that it has scarcely begun.
Today a new evolution is taking place. The modern world is full
of political ideologies all aiming at domination for their own ends,
if necessary by force, including the secret world of men's thoughts.
As against this, one can see a proliferation of subversive move-
ments which, also through the use of force, strive to change the
established order. The result is a climate of extreme tension between
States sometimes known as the cold war and within States struggles
between factions seeking each other's destruction. It often happens
that a section of the population is subjected in its own country to
special legislation, deprived of liberty merely for its opinions, is
arbitrarily confined and, finally, treated less well than enemy
troops captured under arms.
We have seen how during the course of history law first devel-
oped within the community. Attempts were then made to extend
some of its factors to war on an international scale, then to civil war.
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By a strange and surprising reversal of things, the laws of war now
have to be applied in time of peace and for dealing with the internal
affairs of countries. There is, however, no paradox here.
For, it is increasingly believed that the role of international law
is to ensure a minimum of guarantees and of humanity for all,
whether in time of peace or in time of war, whether the individual is
in a state of conflict with a foreign race or with the community to
which he belongs.
The principle of humanitarian law such as we have formulated
it is a relationship of proportion. In the two hypotheses we have just
mentioned, man must be spared, but this he can only be to a
reasonable extent.
From the principle of humanitarian law can be inferred the
principle of the laws of war and that of the rights of man.
PRINCIPLE OF THE LAWS OF WAR
Belligerents shall not inflict harm on their adversaries out of pro-
portion with the object of warfare, which is to destroy or weaken the
military strength of the enemy.
War is contrary to the normal state of society which is that of
peace. As Lorimerl has observed, war is only justified by necessity,
it cannot and should not serve as an end in itself. Lawfully it can
aim at its own annihilation.
In fact, war is a means, the ultimate one, for a State to bend
another to its will. It consists in employing the necessary constraint
in order to obtain this result. All violence which is not indispensable
for achieving this object is therefore without purpose. It then
becomes merely cruel and stupid. According to Montesquieu's
famous formula, international law rests on " the principle that the
various nations should do as much good to each other in time of
peace and the least possible harm without damaging their true
interests in time of war ".
To achieve its object, which is to conquer, a State engaged in a
conflict will seek to destroy or weaken the enemy's war potential at
1
 James LORIMER, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, 1886.
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the cost of the least loss to itself. This consists of two factors, man-
power resources and the materiel he has at his disposal.
Human potential, by which we mean individuals contributing
direct to the war effort, can be used either to kill, wound or capture.
There is no difference between these three methods as regards
military output. To be cynical, all three are capable also of eliminat-
ing the enemy's vital strength.
On the humanitarian level, reasoning is somewhat different.
Death here appears as the final and irreparable evil. There are also
many degrees in the extent of a prisoner's suffering. Humanity
therefore demands that capture should be preferred to wounds, the
latter to death. One should spare non-combatants as far as possible
and that when wounds are inflicted as lightly as circumstances
permit, to enable the wounded to be operated upon and be healed.
Captivity should also be made as bearable as possible.
Military commanders can understand this language, and they
have often understood it, since they are not asked to forgo carrying
out their duty as soldiers and patriots, as they can attain the same
result by inflicting less suffering. Once he is rendered innocuous by
wounds or capture, the enemy no longer plays a role in the progress
of operations and the final outcome of the struggle. It is therefore
useless to prolong his suffering through lack of care or ill-treatment,
even from the most realistic point of view.
Bluntschlix had already written:
International law completely rejects the right to dispose arbitrarily of
individuals. It does not authorize either ill-treatment or violence against them.
The enemy can only undertake measures which military operations require.
War is never an end in itself, but a means for right to be respected or to have
the purposes of the States realized. The forces involved in a war are not of an
absolute character. War must be limited and cease as soon as it no longer
serves the State's purpose.
Thus, the old motto of the rules of war " do as much harm to
your enemy as you can ", has been replaced by the new law, " do
not inflict more harm on your enemy than the object of the war
demands ".
1J. K. BLUNTSCHLI (1808-1881), Swiss jurist, author of: Le droit international
codifii.
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PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF THE HAGUE
Belligerents do not have unlimited choice in the means of inflicting
damage on the enemy.
This principle is derived from the previous one and what we
have just said about the latter is also applicable.
It should be pointed out that the XXth International Conference
of the Red Cross which met in Vienna in 1965 expressly confirmed
this principle in the declaration it made on some of the standards to
be applied in all circumstances in the conduct of hostilities. Amongst
these can be found: "Parties engaged in conflict do not have
unlimited choice of methods to inflict damage on the enemy ".
The rules which derive therefrom will be discussed under a
special heading.1
PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF GENEVA
Persons placed hors de combat and those not directly participating
in hostilities shall be respected, protected and treated humanely.
This concept is inferred from the more general principle govern-
ing the law of war as a whole.
In the face of the most formidable deployment of force ever
known to the world, the Red Cross erected the fragile barriers of
humanitarian law. These were to be intangible only in proportion
to the value placed on human life. " All the provisions of this law
are but the affirmation, each time renewed, that the victims of
conflicts are first of all human beings and that nothing, not even war,
can deprive them of the minimum which respect for the individual
demands ".2 Humanitarian law demands that each person be
treated with humanity, that is to say as an individual and not as an
object, as an end in himself and not as a mere means. To regulate
this treatment of man by man is the characteristic of the Geneva
Conventions.
The principle of Geneva lays down three duties towards the
victims of war: to respect them, give them protection and treat them
1
 See heading 4 below.
2
 Frederic SIORDET, Inter artna caritas, ICRC, Geneva, 1947.
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humanely. These notions are very close to each other, but they are
not synonymous. They have subtle distinctions, but when joined
together they form a complete and harmonious whole. There may
perhaps exist a language in which there is one word signifying these
three things at the same time.
To respect is an attitude of a more or less negative character one
of abstaining, meaning: do not harm, do not threaten, spare the
lives, integrity and the means of existence of others, have regard for
their individual personality.
To protect is a more positive attitude. It is a question then of
preserving others from evils, dangers or suffering to which they may
be exposed, to take their defence and give them aid and support.
As regards humane treatment, it would be useless and hazardous
to enumerate all it constitutes, since it varies according to circum-
stances and one's imagination will always be less swift than that of
those who do harm. To determine it is a question of common sense
and good faith. In the law of Geneva, humane treatment is a
minimum to be reserved for the individual to enable him to lead an
acceptable existence.
We will encounter these three notions in many of the principles
of application which we will be having occasion to define.
PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The individual will see at all times guaranteed the exercising of
his fundamental rights and liberties, as well as the conditions of
existence propitious to the harmonious development of his per-
sonality.
We now enter a different sphere. It is no longer a question of
protecting man against the evils of war, but against the abuses of
the State and the vicissitudes of life. If the legitimate defence of
States justifies certain deviations from the free exercise of the rights
of the individual, they should not go beyond what is necessary for
the safeguarding of the State. To determine this limit and find a
reasonable compromise is the attribute of legislation of human
rights. We have now arrived, and this is to the credit of the United
Nations, at a concept of determining the status of the individual,
valid at all times and in all places, in opposition, even and above all,
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to the authorities of his own country of origin. This status comprises
the declaration of these essential rights and freedoms, the founda-
tions of justice and peace in the world, which are inseparable from
the individual and of a life worthy of that name. Then taking one
step further, the need is recognized of ensuring that everyone
enjoys decent conditions of existence enabling him to attain a
certain level of well-being. By the terms of the preamble to the
Universal Declaration adopted on December 10, 1948, it was a
question of aiming at the " advent of a world in which human beings
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want ", so that man shall " not be compelled to have recourse, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression ".
It is not, however, a matter of only giving encouragement to
those making demands. If there are rights, there are also duties.
It should never be forgotten that each man's rights end where
those of others begin and that every individual has contracted
duties towards the community which offers him an atmosphere
favourable to the development of his personality. What each one
asks for himself, he should therefore also grant to others.
From the fundamental principles which we have just mentioned,
others are derived which we have divided into four categories: the
principles common to the law of Geneva and to Human Rights,
those which relate to the victims of conflicts, those referring to the
laws of war and those which are proper to Human Rights.
2. Common principles
PRINCIPLE OF INVIOLABILITY
The individual has a right to the respect of his life, integrity,
both physical and moral, and of the attributes inseparable from his
personality.
Everyone knows that life is the most precious of all possessions.
If, therefore, one does not accord man the right to live, none of the
other rights have any sense at all.
The respect of life naturally means the exclusion of combatants
in the case of conflict and, at all times, capital sentences regularly
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pronounced, in countries in which the death penalty still exists, and
also that of legitimate defence. Capital punishment, by its barbarous
and irreparable character, seems to us, moreover, to be scarcely
compatible with the sentiment of humanity, nor more with real
justice, which should aim at saving human beings. One would hope
to see it sometime disappear from the surface of the globe. " Blood
cannot be washed away by blood ", as Shakespeare said.
This also applies to physical and moral integrity. One can see
that the human being has sensibility and therefore is sensible to
happiness and to suffering. That is sufficient for one to treat him
with consideration, to cause him no harm and even to provide him
with some pleasure. In recognizing this truth, by introducing him
into its own customs, because it was in conformity with the aspira-
tions of the majority, society has made a right of this, already pro-
claimed in the XVIIIth Century. The above can also to a certain
extent apply to animals. Indian philosophy has already foreseen
this, by prescribing respect for all life.
The principle of inviolability can be explained by the six prin-
ciples of application which it governs:
1. A man who has fallen in combat is inviolable: an enemy sur-
rendering shall have his life spared.
It is obvious that this principle only concerns combatants.
Place has been given to this here only for classification reasons.
It is the key-stone of the Geneva Conventions. One can only kill a
fighting man who is himself in a position to kill. Once all aggressive-
ness has been abandoned an end must be put to hostile action.
It is not necessary to return to the argument which has brought
us to the principle of the laws of war. It is equally valid here.
2. Torture, degrading or inhuman punishment are forbidden.
Amongst the practices which are condemned, that of torture to
extract information appears to be the most reprehensible and
dangerous. For the individual, it is the cause of unspeakable suffer-
ing. It is also a serious affront to the dignity of man, forcing him to
perform acts and make statements against his will and even degrad-
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ing him to the level of a slave in the barbaric age. Furthermore, it
degrades as much the man who inflicts it as his victim.
There are some who claim today that torture is in the interest of
the community and is compatible with legality. However, since the
end of the XVIIIth Century, when judicial torture was abolished,
such a method has been universally rejected by civilized nations.
It is a cause for anxiety that one can observe its return, more or less
clandestinely, sometimes under the cover of emergency laws against
alleged terrorism.
It would be a disastrously retrograde step for humanity to try to
fight terrorism with its own weapons. Authority would thus be
giving tacit approval to manoeuvres which are fundamentally
opposed to the principles of the law which it has, moreover, officially
endorsed on ratifying the Geneva Conventions and proclaiming the
declaration of Human Rights. One cannot hope to achieve improve-
ments in human society if such a degradation of institutions and
public morality is tolerated. Those responsible should therefore not
close their eyes to reprehensible actions committed by their subordi-
nates.
In the face of so many abusive acts of violence which are com-
mitted in the world, it is also to be feared that these will increase and
perpetuate themselves indefinitely by a fatal chain of events.
Cruelty, through the hatred which they invoke calls for vengeance,
reprisals and, consequently, further violence. One is then drawn
into a vicious circle, from which it would later be practically
impossible to extricate oneself.
Finally, there exists the great risk that an increase in brutality
and ill-treatment, the organizing of terrorism or counter-terrorism
might create, as regards these odious methods, a redoubtable
inurement which would consequently weaken moral conscience and
even the sensibility of individuals and masses towards them.1
3. Everyone is entitled to recognition as a person before the law.
It is not sufficient to protect a man's physical and moral integrity.
His personality before the law should also be respected and he
1
 See Henri COURSIER: L'interdiction de la torture, Revue Internationale de la
Croix-Rouge, May 1952.
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should be guaranteed the full exercise of his civic rights, notably
those of going to law and signing contracts, otherwise his whole
existence would risk being compromised.
This recognition figures unrestrictedly in the Universal Declara-
tion. It obviously only applies to majors before the law, not under
restraint and capable of discernment.
The same affirmation of principle can be found in the Geneva
Conventions. It is however qualified by one reservation, namely
that the exercising of civic rights can in fact be reduced, but only in
proportion to which the captivity requires it. This limitation is
legitimate. For, in the mere fact of his being a prisoner of war or an
interned civilian, a man finds his freedom of movement and action
restricted. That is sufficient to prohibit him from performing
certain juridical acts.
Finally, in the sphere of public law, none may be arbitrarily
deprived of his nationality.
4. Everyone has the right to respect of his honour, his family
rights, his convictions and habits.
Man is particularly sensitive as regards his honour and self-
respect. One has seen individuals placing their moral beliefs above
their own lives. Humanity therefore demands that they are given
consideration. Moreover, is not mere politeness already a first step
towards peace?
This is now the place to speak of human dignity. This possesses
two meanings. The respect which one owes oneself and which one
should therefore accord to others by avoiding outraging their
feelings, such is human dignity which must be taken into con-
sideration in the sphere of law. On the other hand, the second
meaning which can be found in so many emphatic declarations
implies a belief in the eminence and nobility of man belonging
a priori to a superior essence. Now, this is a qualification which the
individual bestows on himself and which some regard as pretentious.
Stoicism claimed to base this notion on reason and Kant on man's
faculty to act in accordance with his duty, but these, it is scarcely
necessary to say, are mere postulates, since its appreciation remains
subjective.
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There is no need to stress the unparalleled value of family ties.
It is so considerable that the unscrupulous do not hesitate to exploit
it to force people to perform acts of which they disapprove. To
threaten a man through his affections is possibly the most cowardly
and basest action which can be imagined.
As regards philosophical, political or religious convictions,
these are deeply rooted in men. If they were to be deprived of them,
they would no longer be complete. For one cannot live on bread
alone. It was therefore recognized that everyone has the absolute
right of having a religion or of not having one. The same applies to
customs, for habit becomes second nature. How many primitive
races, subjected by force to a stereotyped civilization, and been
uprooted from their ancestral customs from which they drew their
creative energy, have not rapidly declined?
5. Anyone who is suffering shall be sheltered and receive the care
which his condition requires.
It was to fulfil this imperative duty that the First Geneva Con-
vention was concluded in 1864. It is its corner-stone and from which
all the Conventions' other obligations derive. It is not sufficient to
respect the wounded and sick, they should also be given care
without which they risk succumbing. By suffering is meant not only
all pain, but also all threats to health and the security of the person,
even if these are not painful.
Conceived for the military in time of war, this principle is by
inference valid for civilians and in time of peace. In this last case,
it takes on the more positive aspect, that of the maintenance of
health and the prevention of sickness. As it has been defined by the
World Health Organization " health is a state of complete physical,
mental and social well-being, and does not consist only in an
absence of sickness or infirmity ".
However, no such principle yet figures in the Universal Declara-
tion, in view of the still embryonic character of medical aid in the
developing countries. International medical circles recently pro-
posed to have inserted in it the following stipulation: " every man
has the right to aid if he is wounded or sick ".
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6. Everyone has the right to exchange news with his family and
receive relief parcels.
There is nothing so undermining for morale than anxiety about
the fate of those nearest to us. When circumstances beyond their
control oblige members of a family to be separated, they must be
able to correspond with each other. Captivity should not force
these essential bonds to be broken. Such, moreover, is the raison
) d'Stre of the Central Tracing Agency, which the International
Committee of the Red Cross has set up by virtue of an express
: mandate entrusted to it by the Geneva Conventions.
Similarly, relief parcels prepared by friendly hands, and which
bring with them thoughts of the home country, are not only materially
valuable, they also give moral help in making captivity, distance and
distress more bearable.
" 7. None may be arbitrarily deprived of his own property.
It is not attaching an exaggerated value to material goods to
observe that in the present concept of society, property is inseparable
from life.
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
Individuals shall be treated without any distinction based on race,
sex, nationality, language, social standing, wealth, political, philoso-
phical or religious opinions, or on any other similar criteria.
In order thoroughly to grasp this principle, it is necessary first
of all to discuss a delicate and often debated problem: that of the
equality of rights amongst men. For this purpose we have to return
to first ideas.
? We will submit first of all that one cannot establish relationship
; between things which are fundamentally different such, for example,
I as a camel and a needle. One can only speak of equality or inequality
I between two or several objects if they have at least one point in
I common, known as the factor of comparison. Take colour, for
I example; one can resort to a notion of equality if the colour is the
j same and of inequality, if it is different.
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We then submit that all things which are equal in some of their
aspects are at the same time unequal under other aspects. Even if
two spheres have the same volume, weight and colour they will still
be distinctive by the place they occupy in space, otherwise there
would only be one sphere and one would no longer speak of
equality, but of identity.
Let us consider two spheres of the same colour, but of different
volume. If we say that they are equal we disregard their volume.
If we call them unequal, we do not take their colour into account.
It can thus be seen that the notions of equality and inequality,
outside the abstract field of mathematics, can only ever be appreci-
ated from a particular angle. They are always qualified, subjective
and relative.
What is applicable to objects, is also true of human beings.
These are both equal and unequal at the same time, that is to say,
they are equal between themselves in certain respects and unequal
in others, to an extent which varies according to each individual.
This equality and this inequality can only be appreciated in accord-
ance with the particular aspect being considered.
It is because of this fundamental truth, so long unrecognized,
that two sorts of justice exist. The one, known as commutative,
gives equal quantity to subjects considered as being equal. The other,
called distributive, gives different quantity to subjects regarded as
unequal.1
When should appeal be made to one or the other? Whilst, for
just motives, it is the aspect of equality or inequality between men
which will decide.
Humanitarian morality prescribes the necessity of guaranteeing
to all individuals certain essential rights inseparable from the
human being and the life of the community. It also demands that a
part of the world's riches is distributed to them according to their
needs and assuring them of decent conditions of existence. As
regards rights, men are considered under the angle of equality.
As far as needs and distribution of material goods are concerned
they are considered as being unequal.
1
 These theoretical points have been taken from the excellent work by Mr. Hans
NEF: Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit, Zurich, 1941.
526
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020860400087829
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:37:29, subject to the
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The question of equality can first be broached. If one has
reached the stage in social morality at which the recognition of
rights is recognized, it is not for a profound and absolute, a " trans-
cendental " reason, but, contrary to what is generally believed, for
reasons of expediency which are all relative. The equal value of
individuals is a postulate which is constantly disproved by the facts.
They are, on the contrary, distinct by their physical, intellectual and
moral qualities. What is suffering for some is not the case for others.
By applying equality of treatment to beings who are different is to
obey a mathematical rule, but not that of equity nor of a feeling of
humanity.
Parity can only be the expression of the highest form of justice
when it aims at identical people and in similar circumstances. We
know, however, that this is a myth. In speaking to different beings,
the ideal would require one to give to each not the same thing as to
others, but what suits him personally, because of his character, his
tastes, in other words, his own situation.
However, such a method of sharing is not practicable in the
abstract field of individual rights. First of all it would presuppose a
deep knowledge of each individual case. These are most numerous
and nearly always complicated. So many factors must be taken into
account that one would soon find oneself lost. Furthermore, to
embark on distinctions would be extremely hazardous since one
would risk becoming entangled in the labyrinth of subjective
appreciation. It would be most likely that in looking for equity one
would, more often than not, find partiality and error.
That is why society has determined to base itself on equal rights
between men. This notion has in the long run shown itself to be the
most obvious and convenient way of dealing with relations between
individuals. It will do no serious harm to anyone and even if it does
not enable the highest form of justice to be reached, it at least
offers the maximum chances of already attaining a certain level of
justice.
We can take political rights as an example of this. The system of
universal suffrage has triumphed practically everywhere in the world.
None any longer favours the system of assessment by which the
right to vote was based on a property qualification. Universal suf-
frage starts with the idea that all men possess a certain grain of
527
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020860400087829
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:37:29, subject to the
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
reason which makes them capable of taking part in public affairs.
However, this would be a most hazardous assertion. One could
think, on the contrary, that the destiny of a country should be
entrusted to its best citizens, the wisest, the most intelligent, the
best educated. But how can one know them? One would have to
delve into each one's personality. In view of the impossibility of
choosing such an elite without being mistaken and have one's
choice accepted by the community, one has come round to recog-
nize the same powers for all, with the exception of those with
reduced responsibility such as the mentally sick and persons
undergoing sentences.
However relative it may be, the principle of equality is not
without value. It has already " enabled the two worlds, that of the
masters and that of the servants to meet and fuse into a single
whole ".1 It is not after all, neither " the immortal principle " of the
revolutionary declarations nor the " monstruous fiction " which
Burke attacked in 1852.
The aspiration men have for more justice makes them, in the
absence of a natural equality which fate denies them, hope for an
equalization of their chances and their condition. By a spirit of
equity, they are led to extend its benefits to all human beings and in
a spirit of humanity not even to exclude from it those whom they
hate. From this originates the idea of non-discrimination, the
ultimate outcome of the wish for equality.
We can define discrimination between men, a new term always
with a derogatory meaning, as being a distinction or a segregation
practiced to the detriment of certain individuals, for the sole reason
that they belong to some particular category. One can therefore call
" discriminatory treatment", unequal treatment which through
action or by abstention will result from such an attitude.
Discrimination is always carried out for motives outside the
concrete case. It operates because one only considers, in a given
case, those factors which mark some inequality between men in a
sphere in which equality ought to predominate.
The principle of non-discrimination originally found expression
in the Geneva Conventions, namely that a soldier rendered hors de
1
 Jean-G. LOSSIER, Les civilisations et le service du prochain, Paris, 1958.
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combat by wounds or sickness shall be aided whether he be friend
or enemy with the same readiness. Until 1929, the Convention only
prohibited distinctions based on nationality. In 1949, distinctions
were excluded which were grounded on " race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria ". These
show well enough that all discrimination is forbidden and that
those mentioned in the text are only given by way of examples.
Evidently, they were previously prohibited by implication. It was
the sorrowful experience of the Second World War which obliged
them to be set forth in writing.
A similar formula can be found in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Mention however is not made there of nationality,
for in this sphere there exist legitimate cases where the alien will not
possess the same rights as the national of a country.
Let us now study the question of inequality between men. Since
the end of the XVIIIth Century it has been understood that there is
no reason for the world's wealth to be in the hands of a privileged
minority. It is also known that suffering, poverty, sickness and
ignorance are not the inevitable lot of the great mass of people.1
One has therefore claimed for each one a portion of the common
heritage, a place in the sun, a share of happiness. Without wishing
to establish complete equality between men, which would be non-
sensical, an attempt has been made to find a compromise, namely to
offer a minimum of advantages to all, something which each one
asks for himself and which he is prepared to recognize for others.
That is what is known as equality of treatment.
However, men have basically different needs, either on account
of their own natures, or because misfortune has destroyed equality
amongst the living. Justice demands that the balance be re-estab-
lished. Now, to bring men to the same level is to concern oneself the
most effectively and first of all with those who have least. This
means distributing aid in proportion to the distress involved. One
can only remedy some inequality in a situation by making unequal
provision.
One can take public taxation as an example. There was a time
when only the poor paid taxes. This crying injustice was moreover
1
 Gaius EZEJIOFOR, Protection of Human Rights under the law, London, 1964.
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one of the causes of the French Revolution. Does equity demand
that each person pays the same tax? By no means, as the principle
of due proportion has been everywhere accepted. Everyone pays his
contribution in relation to what he earns and possesses. Even more,
a system of progression is now employed. The wealthy take a more
than proportional part from the State's expenditure, for the more a
person's resources are far from the vital minimum, the more the
excess increases which can be heavily tapped. In this case, a just
reason based on economic considerations has been taken into
account.
It can be seen that the principle of non-discrimination, mentioned
above, cannot be understood in the absolute sense. Some corrective
to it is necessary. There are in fact distinctions which it is legitimate
and even necessary to make. In the framework of humanitarian law,
it will be those based on suffering, distress or natural weakness,
and only those.
The Geneva Conventions, revised in 1949, are no longer silent
on this point as was formerly the case. They prohibit " unfavour-
able " distinctions. The term is inadequate, but it was meant to
signify that there are permissible even obligatory distinctions.
Thus, as is stated, women will be treated with all the regards due to
their sex. Similarly, it is normal to favour children and the aged.
It has also been admitted that special conditions of accommodation,
heating and clothing be granted prisoners accustomed to a tropical
climate who may find themselves in a cold region.
Alongside the quantitative inequality of treatment, the Con-
ventions establish even more clearly its inequality in time. Thus they
stipulate that " only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority
in the order of treatment to be administered ". Let us suppose that
somewhere the Army Medical Service had to cope with an influx of
wounded. The medical officers, without taking nationality into
account, would first of all care for those for whom delay would be
fatal, or at least highly prejudicial, then they would deal with those
whose condition would not require immediate attention. In the
same way, distributions of food and medicines should be based on
the most urgent need.
In so far as Human Rights are concerned, distinctions which are
permissible are to be found in economic and social rights. To
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ensure that individuals have adequate conditions of existence, one
should take into account their personal situation, needs and
capabilities which are eminently variable. When one says that
everyone has the right to work, this does not mean that each has the
right to become a director, but should have a position in accordance
with his capability.
There is so much truth in this that the great principle of non-
discrimination should be completed by a principle of application as
follows: Differences in treatment should however be made for the
benefit of individuals in order to counter inequalities resulting from
their personal situation, their needs or their distress.
PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY
Everyone has the right to security of person.
The principles of application define the content of this general
principle. These are:
1. None can be held responsible for an act which he has not
committed.
2. Reprisals, collective punishments, the taking of hostages and
deportations shall be prohibited.
This last principle derives directly from the previous one. It is
only valid in time of conflict. Such prohibitions which now figure in
the Geneva Conventions are certainly remarkable achievements in
the development of humanitarian law.
Reprisals, by which one means repressive acts which a State is
led to direct against an adversary in answer to illicit acts carried out
by him, are still, generally speaking, admitted in international law
as the only method of coercion available to a State, in time of war,
to oblige an opponent to respect his obligations.
It runs however counter to the principle of law which lays down
that no innocent person shall suffer for one who is responsible.
Furthermore, it causes much suffering and nearly always misses its
object. At all events, reprisals against persons protected by the
Geneva Conventions are absolutely prohibited. This prohibition
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accords with the modern evolution of international law, another
step forward for the principle of State sovereignty.
This also applies to collective penalties. These are now totally
prohibited by the Geneva Conventions, whilst article 50 of The
Hague Regulations still tolerated them in principle. Thus the Latin
concept of personal responsibility prevails over the Germanic
notion.
Article 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the
shortest of all, striking in its simplicity, by stipulating the " taking
of hostages is prohibited ", is a complete innovation in international
law. It has put an end to a reprehensible and cowardly practice of
which the two world wars have seen only too many examples.
After the forced transfers of such large numbers of persons
during the Second World War and the resulting immense distress,
one must highly appreciate the provision of article 49 of the Fourth
Convention which prohibits deportations. This practice has already
been condemned in the doctrine and handbooks on the laws of war,
but they were not the subject of any provision in international law.
3. Each person shall benefit from legal guarantees recognized by
civilized peoples.
These guarantees are chiefly as follows: none can be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention; no one shall be held guilty except on
the basis of a law and by virtue of a sentence pronounced by a
court regularly constituted and presenting the requisite conditions
of impartiality; penal law shall not be retroactive; an accused
person shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty; everyone
charged with a penal offence shall be given assistance in his defence
and be entitled to the hearing of his own witnesses.
4. None can abrogate the rights which the humanitarian Conven-
tions accord him.
This is a question of a provision of the Geneva Conventions
framed to prevent practices which were only too prevalent in the
Second World War. Such practices tended to offer to protected
persons a more apparently favourable status, but which in fact
deprived them of benefiting from the Conventions. Such status
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resulted more often than not in special agreements which gave the
impression that the detaining authorities were giving those con-
cerned the possibility of choosing their own conditions of existence.
In point of fact, pressure was put upon them, if only by enticing
them with more or less fictitious advantages.
The Diplomatic Conference adopted a radical solution by
protecting the victims of conflicts against themselves. It considered
that persons in the power of the enemy are not in fact in a sufficient
position of independence or objectivity enabling them to take
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